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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-802(1)(b): 
[T]he obligation is suspended pro tanto until 
the instrument is due or if it is payable on 
demand until its presentment. If the 
instrument is dishonored action may be 
maintained on either the instrument or the 
obligation. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-511 (3) : "[P]ayment by check is 
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of 
the check on due presentment." 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(2)(c) : "[C]ontract that has 
not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect less 
than 60 days. . . . No cancellation under this subsection is 
effective until at least (10) days after the delivery to the 
insured of a written notice of cancellation." 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-310(2) and (2)(a): 
[I]f a note or an uncertified check is taken 
for an obligation, the obligation is suspended 
to the same extent the obligation would be 
discharged if an amount of money equal to the 
amount of the instrument were taken, and the 
following rules apply: 
(a) In the case of an uncertified 
check, suspension of the obligation 
continues until dishonor of the 
check or until it is paid or 
certified. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellant seeks to clarify the statement of issues on appeal 
by stating that the only issue in this case is whether Mr. Bell 
had an insurance policy in full force and effect on August 11, 
1991, in light of the fact that Phoenix Indemnity did not cancel 
the policy for non-payment of premium. Upon further review, it 
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appears that Appellant's statement of the issues merely refines 
Appellee's statement of the issues, by breaking Appellee's 
statement of the issue into workable issues of law, which are: 
1. Whether acceptance of a check as payment is conditional, 
which condition is satisfied only when the check is honored at the 
bank upon which it is drawn. 
2. Whether giving of a worthless check satisfies the 
condition precedent necessary to form an insurance contract. 
3. Whether notice of cancellation is required when an 
insurance contract does not exist due to the fact that payment of 
the premium has not been made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S ARGUMENT THAT "ACCEPTANCE OF A CHECK 
AS PAYMENT IS CONDITIONAL, [WHICH] CONDITION IS SATISFIED 
ONLY IF THE CHECK IS HONORED AT THE BANK UPON WHICH IT 
IS DRAWN," WAS RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND THEREFORE 
THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN FROM THE COURT'S 
CONSIDERATION. 
The Appellee incorrectly states that the matter of conditional 
payment was not raised at the trial level and therefore cannot be 
considered on appeal. While it is true that two Uniform Commercial 
Code provisions, Utah Code Annotated Sections 70A-2-511(3) (cited 
by Appellee as 70A-3-511(3)) and 70A-3-802(1)(b), were not cited 
at the trial level, Appellee has not cited any case law which sets 
forth that statutes or case law not cited at the trial level cannot 
be cited on appeal. (See Appellant's Brief p. 11.) Appellee 
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rather cites cases standing for the well known principle of law 
that issues not addressed at the trial level cannot be addressed 
for the first time on appeal. Phoenix Indemnity has not addressed 
an issue for the first time on appeal, but rather has buttressed 
its argument that in fact, acceptance of a check as payment is 
conditionalf which condition is satisfied only if the check is 
honored at the bank upon which it is drawn. 
Phoenix Indemnity first addressed the issue that their 
acceptance of Mr. Bell's worthless check was conditional upon its 
presentment and subsequent honor by his bank in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Phoenix Indemnity stated in their motion for 
summary judgment that "the premium payment [Mr. Bell] gave [was] 
a condition precedent to receiving insurance." R. 81. This point 
was subsequently argued by Appellee in its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellee 
stated in this motion that there are exceptions to the general rule 
that "delivery of a check to an insurer and its acceptance thereof 
is not payment of the debt until the check itself has been paid." 
R. 127. Phoenix Indemnity addressed the issue again in its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmentf 
wherein it stated that "acceptance of the premium check by the bank 
was a condition precedent to insurance coverage." R. 141. Based 
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on the foregoing it is evident that the matter of conditional 
payment was in fact raised at the trial level and therefore can be 
considered on appeal along with the case law, statutes and 
treatises cited in Appellant's brief which supports Appellant's 
argument. 
II. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31A-21-303 DOES NOT ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE OF CONDITIONAL PAYMENT WHICH UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED SECTIONS 70A-2-511(3) AND 70A-3-802(1)(b) 
ADDRESS. 
Appellee would like this court to only consider Utah Code 
Annotated Section 31A-21-303 when addressing all issues on appeal. 
However, that section only deals with cancellation of an insurance 
policy. It does not address the issue of conditional payment which 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 70A-2-511(3) and 70A-3-802(1)(b) 
address. 
Appellee argues that statutes relating to a specific subject 
should be given preference over those dealing more generally with 
the subject. Appellant agrees. Utah Code Annotated Section 
31A-21-303 does not address the issue of conditional payment. Utah 
Code Annotated Sections 70A-2-511(3) and 70A-3-802(1)(b) 
specifically addresses the issue of conditional payment. 
Therefore, according to Appellee's argument, Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 70A-2-511(3) and 70A-3-802(1)(b) should be given 
preference when dealing with the issue of conditional payment 
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because they relate specifically to the subject at issue. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 70A-*3-802 (1) (b) states: 
[T]he obligation is suspended pro tanto until 
the instrument is due or if it is payable on 
demand until its presentment. If the 
instrument is dishonored action may be 
maintained on either the instrument or the 
obligation. 
In addition, Section 70A-2-511(3) states: "[P]ayment by check is 
conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of 
the check on due presentment." 
III. 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S INSURANCE POLICY WAS CONDITIONAL UPON 
SUBSEQUENT HONOR OF MR. BELL'S PREMIUM PAYMENT. 
The general rule of acceptance of a check as payment is that 
a check is conditionally accepted until it is properly presented 
and subsequently honored by the bank. See 14A Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, § 8144, n. 53. See also Utah Code Annotated 
Section 70A-2-511(3) ("[P]ayment by check is conditional and is 
defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due 
presentment.") Appellee asserts that there are exceptions to the 
general rule, namely express or implied intentions. (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 13.) 
Although Appellee cites Cullotta v. Kemper Corp.. 87 111.2d 
25, 397 N.E.2d 1372 (1979), in support of the above claimed 
exception to the general rule, Cullotta is distinguishable from 
the case at bar. In Cullotta neither the binder nor the insurance 
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policy contained any conditional language. The first conditional 
language ever used was in a letter sent to the insured notifying 
him that his check had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 
In that letter, the insurer stated for the first time that 
"coverage under the policy was "contingent upon payment of the 
premium.'" .Id. at 1374. In the case at bar, conditional language 
was used in both the binder and the insurance policy. Mr. Bell 
signed an application which stated that "if my premium is not 
honored by the bank, no coverage will be considered bound." 
[Emphasis added.] Further, the insurance policy issued to Mr. Bell 
stated on page 1, paragraph 1, that "We agree with you, in return 
for your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms 
of this policy." [Emphasis added.] Unlike Cullotta, Phoenix 
Indemnity's insurance policy contained conditional payment language 
in both the binder and insurance policy evidencing its intent that 
insurance coverage was conditional upon payment of his premium. 
In addition, Mr. Bell was on notice, long before Phoenix Indemnity 
notified him of his dishonored check, that if his premium payment 
was not honored by his bank that Phoenix Indemnity would not 
provide him with insurance coverage. Phoenix Indemnity's binder 
and policy language express its intentions regarding the 
conditional nature of their insurance coverage. Acceptance of Mr. 
Bell's check and obtaining Mr. Bell's signature on the binder 
stating that insurance coverage was conditional upon subsequent 
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honor of his check sufficiently evidences Phoenix Indemnity's 
intentions that insurance coverage was conditional. 
In addition, Cullotta is again distinguishable from the case 
at bar inasmuch as Cullotta involved a renewal policy rather than 
issuance of a new policy. The case at bar deals with an initial 
insurance policy - not one already in force. Renewal of an 
insurance policy is significantly different than issuance of an 
initial insurance policy. Renewal extends the coverage of an 
existing insurance policy. Issuance of an initial insurance policy 
involves the completion of an application and binder before an 
insurance policy is issued. See Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143 
Ariz. 553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984). The insurance binder controls 
coverage issues before the policy is issued. The insurance binder 
is the insured's receipt and controls coverage issues. Once a 
policy is issued the policy controls the coverage issues. 
Appellee also relies on Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335 
(Mo. 1969) in support of its position. Clarification of the facts 
in that case is needed inasmuch as Appellee's summary is incomplete 
and does not fully explain the facts which ultimately bear on 
Appellee's argument. In Bartleman, Mrs. Humphrey chose not to 
renew an existing insurance policy, but rather to arrange for a new 
policy with different coverage. The new policy was to provide 
coverage from November 29, 1960, through February 29, 1961. 
However, Mrs. Humphrey's bank did not honor her check due to 
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insufficient funds. Therefore, her check was returned and mailed 
to her on December 27, 1960, with a letter stating that "Since the 
check was not honored on presentation, the premium is not paid and 
your policy has lapsed or will lapse as of 10:00 A.M. on the date 
the premium was or is due," namely November 29, 1960. Thereafter, 
on January 6, 1961, Mrs. Humphrey mailed a money order to her 
insurance company. The money order arrived on January 9, 1961. 
The company accepted the money order as payment and the policy was 
reinstated "effective l-9-61-9:A.M." Mr. Humphrey was involved in 
an automobile accident on January 9, 1961 at 6:10 a.m. When 
advised of the accident the insurer advised the Humphreys that 
their policy had lapsed on November 29, 1960, and was not 
reinstated until January 9, 1961, at 9:00 a.m., after the accident 
occurred. However, insurance records showed that the premium was 
paid prior to issuance of the insurance policy. The money order 
was considered as a cash payment. Thereafter, the court found that 
the premium payment had been paid at the time of the accident and 
that the policy was in effect at the time the accident occurred, 
even though the policy had not yet been issued. 
Nonetheless, Appellee cites Bartleman for the contention that 
Phoenix Indemnity's insurance policy did not contain the 
conditional language required to defeat insurance coverage. 
However, the language in the Bartleman policy is different than 
that used in the Phoenix Indemnity insurance policy. The Phoenix 
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Indemnity policy states that: "We agree with you, in return for 
your premium payment, to insure you subject to all the terms of 
this policy." [Emphasis added.] An insurance policy is a 
contract. Without the condition precedent of consideration, it is 
well settle law that the contract is void. Bartleman at 342. 
Because Mr. Bell's insurance premium check was not honored by his 
bank, the contract which required payment of the same is void. 
It was brought to Appellant's attention and is correct that 
Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143 Ariz. 576, 694 P.2d 1190 (1983) 
was vacated. Nonetheless, Statewide Ins. Corp. v. Dewar, 143 Ariz. 
553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984) does not support Appellee's position. 
In fact, unlike Appellee represents the facts, an insurance policy 
was not issued by the insurer. (See Brief of Appellee at p. 18.) 
The insurer only issued a binder. The binder did not contain any 
conditional payment language. The Supreme Court of Arizona 
therefore only reviewed the "narrow issue of whether a binder for 
automobile liability insurance covers the prospective insured for 
an accident occurring between the time coverage is bound and the 
application for insurance is rejected." .Id. The court found 
Bartleman, supra, instructive and held that "the insurer has the 
right to treat the check as conditional payment" but that "once the 
insurer accepts the check without evidencing an intent to do so 
conditionally, it can no longer exercise its right to declare the 
policy lapsed due to nonpayment." The case at bar is factually 
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different, inasmuch as it does not deal with a binder (or an 
insurance policy) that is void of conditional language. As 
discussed above, both Phoenix Indemnity's binder and policy 
contained conditional language that conditioned coverage upon 
subsequent honor of Mr. Bell's check. Therefore, Phoenix 
Indemnity's intent is evident. Phoenix Indemnity intended to make 
insurance coverage conditional upon acceptance and subsequent honor 
of Mr. Bell's premium check by his bank. 
Appellee seeks to distinguish Tallent v* Tennessee Farmers 
Mut. Ins., 785 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1990), by stating that the insured 
never had sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check. (See 
Brief of Appellee at p. 19.) However, the case at bar is not much 
different than Tallent because Mr. Bell had sufficient funds on 
very few days after giving his worthless check. There is no cited 
case law which requires an insured to determine which day one has 
enough funds in his account and then present a check for payment 
on that day only. The fact that the insured in Tallent did not 
ever have sufficient funds in her bank only bolstered the court's 
determination that acceptance of a check is conditional until 
honored by the bank. Obviously, Mrs. Tallent's check would never 
have been honored by her bank. In Mr. Bell's case, there were very 
poor odds that presentment at any time would have been met with 
subsequent honor of Mr. Bell's check. Nonetheless, the court in 
Tallent found that acceptance of a check is conditional until 
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honored by the bank. .Id. at 343. Likewise, Phoenix Indemnity is 
not liable for coverage because it is established law that 
acceptance of a check is conditional upon its subsequent honor by 
the bank. 
Phoenix Indemnity demonstrated its intent both in its binder 
and insurance policy that coverage was conditioned upon subsequent 
honor of the premium payment check. In addition, legal principles 
show that the premium payments are conditional. Therefore, Mr. 
Bell did not have insurance coverage at the time of his accident. 
His failure to provide the necessary condition precedent negates 
insurance coverage. 
IV. 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO REFUSE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE TO MR. BELL AND IS THEREFORE NOT 
ESTOPPED FROM SO DOING. 
Appellee contends that Appellant has by its own conduct either 
waived or is estopped from relying on the conditional payment rule. 
The general rule is that if a worthless check is given for the 
first premium, insurance coverage never goes into effect. See 14A 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 8144 (1985). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Bell signed an insurance application 
stating that he understood "that if my premium is not honored by 
the bank, no coverage will be considered bound." By this 
acknowledged statement alone it is clear that Phoenix Indemnity is 
and was not bound to provide insurance coverage to Mr. Bell because 
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acceptance of the premium check by the bank was a condition 
precedent to any insurance coverage. Zions Bank did not honor Mr. 
Bell's premium check and therefore Phoenix Indemnity was not bound 
to provide insurance coverage. 
Even if Justin Bell had not acknowledged that insurance 
coverage was conditional upon the bank's acceptance of his premium 
check, the general rule is that "in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary, the delivery of a check to an insurer and its 
acceptance thereof is not payment of the debt until the check 
itself has been paid." 14A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice. 
§ 8144 (1985). Mr. Bell did not have an agreement with Phoenix 
Indemnity that coverage would be provided before his check was 
honored. In fact, the policy that was issued before Phoenix 
Indemnity received notice of Justin Bell's dishonored check, states 
again that insurance coverage is conditional upon payment of Justin 
Bell's premium. On page 1, paragraph 1, of the issued policy, it 
states: "We agree with you, in return for your premium payment, 
to insure you subject to all the terms of this policy." (Emphasis 
added.) Appellee itself has admitted that "once Phoenix Indemnity 
issued the policy, its terms became controlling." R. 130. The 
conditional payment of Mr. Bell's premium was never made, and 
therefore Phoenix Indemnity did not agree to cover Justin Bell 
under the insurance policy. 
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This case at bar is similar to Tallent v. Tennessee Farmers 
Mut. Insurance, 785 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tenn. 1990) wherein the 
insured issued a worthless check to renew an insurance policy. 
The policy that was being renewed included conditional language 
precisely the same as Phoenix Indemnity's policy: "We agree with 
you, in return for your premium payment, to provide insurance 
subject to all the terms of this policy." (Emphasis added.) The 
court found this language to constitute conditional language and 
the policy was not renewed because issuance of a worthless check 
is not considered payment for purposes of coverage by an insurance 
company. The same court also cites Appleman as saying: "If such 
a check is given for the first premium, that coverage never goes 
into effect." Id. at 343. See 14A Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice, § 8144 (1985). Like Tallent, Justin Bell gave a 
worthless check, not for renewal, but for the first premium. 
Because the check was dishonored upon presentment, no coverage was 
ever in effect. 
The only way Mr. Bell could have obtained coverage was to have 
Phoenix Indemnity unconditionally accept his worthless check as a 
valid payment. Phoenix Indemnity did not unconditionally accept 
his check. Phoenix Indemnity included conditional language in both 
their application as well as their policy. Phoenix Indemnity did 
not waive its right to conditionally accept Justin Bell's check. 
Therefore, Phoenix Indemnity cannot be estopped from denying 
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insurance coverage to Justin Bell. "Estoppel occurs when the party 
claiming benefit of the doctrine has relied upon actions or 
representations of the other party which are inconsistent with the 
position taken by the other party at trial." Gurley v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 428 N.E.2d 916 (111. 1981). Phoenix 
Indemnity did not misrepresent its intentions of making acceptance 
of Justin Bell's payment as conditional. Both the application and 
policy used conditional language. Therefore, the doctrine of 
estoppel does not apply to the case at bar. 
Appellee asserts the argument that Phoenix Indemnity should 
have, but did not resubmit Justin Bell's check for payment. The 
general rule is that an insurer is "not bound to return the check 
a second time for payment." 14A Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice,, § 8144 (1985). Justin Bell might have had sufficient 
funds on very few days subsequent to the initial dishonor by Zions 
Bank. However, it is not an insurer's responsibility to determine 
which day is best to resubmit a check and therefore play a guessing 
game. The check was dishonored and therefore no payment was made, 
which leaves Justin Bell without insurance coverage. 
Appellee also argues that Phoenix Indemnity's "notice of 
cancellation or non-renewal" implies that an insurance policy was 
in force and that Phoenix Indemnity was required to and did not 
comply with statutory notice requirements to cancel. As discussed 
above, not only was the application for coverage conditional, but 
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also the insurance policy itself due to the conditional language 
on the front page in the first paragraph. See Tallent at 339. 
What Phoenix Indemnity did was make a good faith effort to notify 
Mr. Bell that the policy was not in force and never went into force 
due to dishonor of his check for insufficient funds. It was not 
Phoenix Indemnity's intent to cancel a policy, rather it intended 
to notify Mr. Bell that he did not have any insurance coverage in 
force. 
It is the intent of the parties that is controlling. Appellee 
cites Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Davis. 151 111. App. 3rd 929, 
503 N.E.2d 565 (111. App. 2d D. 1987) cert, den., 571 N.E.2d 427 
(1987), in support of its argument that Phoenix Indemnity waived 
its right to declare that the insurance policy was not in force. 
This case, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar. 
Unlike Farmers, wherein the insurer "waived its right to declare 
the policy lapsed for nonpayment of the premium" when the premium 
check was dishonored, Phoenix Indemnity's actions never expressly 
or impliedly waived its conditional acceptance of Justin Bell's 
premium check. By all of Phoenix Indemnity's acts, it is obvious 
that its intent was to make Mr. Bell's insurance coverage 
conditional upon acceptance of his check by Zions Bank. When Zions 
Bank did not honor Mr. Bell's check, Phoenix Indemnity intended to 
notify Mr. Bell of such and also to notify Mr. Bell that he did not 
have any insurance coverage. Therefore the "notice of cancellation 
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or non-renewal" cannot be construed to imply that coverage was in 
force. 
Appellee also asserts that Phoenix Indemnity issued Mr. Bell 
an insurance policy after it knew his check was dishonored. This 
is an incorrect assumption of the facts. In fact, one department 
at Phoenix Indemnity received notice on July 29, 1991, that Justin 
Bell's check had been returned without payment. On the same date, 
another department sent a policy. Because departments perform 
different functions, there was not immediate notice to all 
departments at Phoenix Indemnity of Mr. Bell's dishonored check. 
Therefore, the sending of the policy was not done with notice of 
Justin Bell's dishonored check, which also shows that it was not 
Phoenix Indemnity's intent to issue a policy unconditionally. 
Phoenix Indemnity agreed to provide insurance coverage to Mr. 
Bell upon the condition that his check was honored by Zions Bank. 
Mr. Bell's check was dishonored, and therefore no coverage was 
provided. Under this fact situation, the law of waiver and 
estoppel do not apply. 
V. 
CONSIDERATION, WHICH WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
INSURANCE COVERAGE, WAS NOT RECEIVED. 
Appellee cites 12 A.L.R.3d 1304, 1318 (1967) claiming that 
payment of a premium is not a prerequisite to insurance coverage. 
However, Appellee fails to distinguish between insurance binders 
and insurance policies. The law distinguishes between these two 
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types of insurance coverage. See Statewide Ins. Corp* v. Dewar, 
143 Ariz. 553, 694 P.2d 1167 (1984). Case law dealing with 
insurance binders does not always apply to insurance policies. 
Id. Nonetheless, in Dewar at p. 1168, the court stated that 
"Neither the binder coverage nor the policy goes into effect until 
the payment required has actually been made." This court did 
require payment of the premium as a condition precedent to 
insurance coverage. 
Appellee seeks to distinguish McCormick v. State Capital Life 
Ins. Co., 254 S.C. 544, 172 S.E.2d 308 (1980), from the case at 
bar. However, the cases are identical due to the fact that Phoenix 
Indemnity did not know that Mr. Bell's check was dishonored at the 
time it issued the insurance policy. Therefore, the court's ruling 
that "since the check for the payment of the first monthly premium 
was never paid, the insurance policy was never of any force or 
effect and afforded the applicant no coverage" still applies to the 
case at bar. Id. 
While Appellee correctly states that opinion letters from the 
Attorney General are not controlling in the appellate courts of 
this state they do provide insight into the question that is 
directly at issue in this case and was provided to the court for 
that reason. 
Appellee provides no case law that supports its argument that 
a promise to pay is sufficient consideration. In addition, 
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Appellee provides no case law that supports its argument that the 
dishonored check given to Phoenix Indemnity is the equivalent to 
a promise to pay. Argument without supporting case law is just 
that. Appellant has cited case law similar to the fact situation 
at issue which states that "[t]he mere giving or sending of a 
worthless check to the insurer does not affect the payment of a 
premium the result being, if such check is given for the first 
premium, that coverage never goes into effect . . . " See 14A 
Appleman § 8144, P. 176 (1985). 
VI. 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY WAS NOT BOUND TO CANCEL A POLICY THAT 
DID NOT EXIST IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SECTION 31A-21-303. 
Appellee states that the purpose of the notice requirements 
are to protect the insured. While this may be true, in the case 
at bar there is not an insured to protect. One does not become an 
insured until all the requirements of a contract have been met. 
Mr. Bell did not provide the consideration (payment of the premium) 
necessary to form a contract. Therefore, as more fully discussed 
above in Argument V, Mr. Bell did not become an insured because he 
did not provide the consideration necessary to form a contract. 
While Appellee cites Godov v. Farmers Ins. Group, 759 P.2d 
1173 (Utah App. 1988), for the principle of law that notice of 
cancellation is required to cancel an insurance policy, this case 
can be distinguished from the case at bar. In addition, the 
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Appellee cites a statute in Godoy that has since been repealed to 
support its position. (See Utah Code Annotated § 31-41-16(1) 
(1974) (repealed). Nonetheless, in Godoy, Mr. Godoy was issued a 
six month insurance policy. He paid the insurance premium for the 
first six months. Thereafter he made a payment of twice the usual 
monthly amount so that he would have insurance coverage for two 
additional months. Thereafter no premium payments were made. The 
insurance company sent Mr. Godoy a notice of cancellation. After 
the termination date on the notice of cancellation, Mr. Godoy was 
involved in an accident. The court held, under the statute in 
effect at the time of the accident, Utah Code Annotated Section 
31-41-14 (repealed), that the insurance company was required to 
write insurance policies for a term of not less than twelve months 
and therefore that Mr. Godoy was considered to have insurance 
coverage for a twelve month period. The insurance company could 
not terminate an insurance policy for nonpayment of a premium 
payment during the twelve month period when it was required to 
provide insurance coverage for not less than twelve months. While 
the new insurance code contains no similar provision, that was the 
holding of the court under the old statutory provision. The case 
at bar is not similar in any manner to the issue addressed in 
Godoy. The case at bar does not deal with the issue of the length 
of the insurance policy or the cited statutes that have since been 
repealed. Unlike the case at bar, Godoy dealt with an insurance 
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policy that had been issued. Godoy did not deal with an initial 
worthless premium check. Godoy is therefore inapplicable to the 
case at bar. 
Appellee next cites Haqerl v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 157 
Mich. App. 683, 403 N.W.2d 197 (1987), leave to appeal den., 428 
Mich. 900 (1987) to support its position. Haqerl is also 
distinguishable from the case at bar. Haqerl deals with the 
renewal of an insurance policy rather that formation of an initial 
insurance policy. The renewal language in the Haqerl insurance 
policy states: "If we offer to renew this policy, and the 
Principal Named Insured declines, it will automatically terminate 
at the end of the policy term. Failure to pay the required renewal 
premium means that our offer to renew has been declined." Haqerl 
at 198. The court found that this language informed the insured 
that he or she is not bound to an unwanted contract when renewal 
notices are sent out. The renewal clause merely notified the 
insured that he or she did not have to take any affirmative action 
to forego renewal. The fact situation in the case at bar could not 
be more dissimilar than it is to Haqerl. The case at bar does not 
deal with a renewal policy or with similar policy language. The 
case at bar deals with an insurance contract that was never formed 
due to the fact that Mr. Bell did not provide the necessary 
consideration to form a contract. 
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In addition, unlike Appellee contends that Hagerl sets forth 
the principle that giving of a premium check evidences payment, 
giving of a premium check is not payment of a premium. The issue 
of payment is discussed more fully above and sets forth that 
acceptance of a premium check is conditional upon subsequent honor 
by the bank. (See Argument III.) 
Neither of Appellee's cited cases supports its position. 
Neither case sets forth that an insurance company is bound to give 
notice of cancellation in the fact situation at issue in this case, 
where an insurance policy does not even exist. When an insurance 
policy does not exist it cannot be cancelled and therefore no 
notice of cancellation is required. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bell signed an insurance application which stated that 
"if my premium is not honored by the bank, no coverage will be 
considered bound." [Emphasis added.] Further, the insurance policy 
issued to Mr. Bell stated on page 1, paragraph 1, that "We agree 
with you, in return for your premium payment, to insure you subject 
to all the terms of this policy." [Emphasis added.] Both the 
binder and the insurance policy contain language stating that 
insurance coverage in conditioned upon the premium payment being 
honored by the bank. This subsequent honor of the premium payment 
is the condition precedent to the formation of an insurance 
contract and therefore insurance coverage. Mr. Bell did not 
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provide the condition precedent and therefore no insurance coverage 
existed and the insurance policy at issue is void. Because 
insurance coverage does not exist, cancellation of a policy is 
impossible. One cannot cancel something that does not exist. 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant urges this court to 
reverse the lower court's ruling and find that Mr. Bell did not 
have insurance coverage at the time of his accident due to his 
failure to provide the condition precedent to formation of a valid 
and binding insurance contract and therefore that Phoenix Indemnity 
was not required to provide any notice of cancellation. 
DATED this f ^ day of July, 1994. 
WENiJELL E. BENNET^ 
JEANNINE BENNETT 
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES 
/Attorneys for Appellant 
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